Data and Code for: Designing Call Auction Institutions to Eliminate Price Bubbles: Is English Dutch the Best?

Resource Type
  • Tucker, Steven (The University of Waikato)
  • Deck, Cary (The University of Alabama and Chapman University)
  • SERVÁTKA, MAROŠ (Macquarie Graduate School of Management and University of Economics in Bratislava)
Publication Date
Funding Reference
  • Waikato Management School, University of Waikato
Free Keywords
Asset Markets; Experimental Economics; Institutional design
  • Abstract

    The bubble and burst pattern in asset markets is among the most replicable results in experimental economics. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we compare mispricing in markets organized by standard double auction rules with mispricing in markets organized two alternative sets clock auctions. The double Dutch auction, shown to be more efficient than the double auction in past commodity market experiments, does not eliminate bubbles. However, the English Dutch auction does yield prices reflective of underlying fundamentals and succeeds in taming bubbles even with inexperienced traders in a declining fundamental value environment with an increasing cash-to-asset ratio.

Update Metadata: 2020-05-28 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-05-28