Data and Code for "Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts"
- Johannesen, Niels (University of Copenhagen)
- Langetieg, Patrick (Internal Revenue Service)
- Reck, Daniel (London School of Economics)
- Risch, Max (Princeton University)
- Slemrod, Joel (University of Michigan)
AbstractThis contains the data and code from our 2019 paper, "Taxing Hidden Wealth." This material has been cleared for public release by the Internal Revenue Service. See the readme file for further details.
Abstract: In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
Johannesen, Niels, Patrick Langetieg, Daniel Reck, Max Risch, and Joel Slemrod. “Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of U.S. Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, n.d.
Update Metadata: 2020-07-06 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-07-06