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Data and Code for: Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Boyer, Martin (HEC Montreal)
  • De Donder, Philippe (Toulouse School of Economics)
  • Fluet, Claude Denys (Université Laval)
  • Leroux, Marie-Louise (UQAM)
  • Michaud, Pierre-Carl (HEC Montreal)
Publication Date
2020-07-23
Funding Reference
  • SSHRC
    • Award Number: 435- 2016-1109
  • ANR
    • Award Number: ANR-17-EURE-0010
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
Geographic Coverage
  • Canada
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Has version
    DOI: 10.3886/E115322V1
Publications
  • Boyer, Martin, Philippe De Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise Leroux, and Pierre-Carl Michaud. “Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, n.d.

Update Metadata: 2020-07-23 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-07-23

Boyer, Martin; De Donder, Philippe; Fluet, Claude Denys; Leroux, Marie-Louise; Michaud, Pierre-Carl (2020): Data and Code for: Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E115322