Data and Code for: Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection
- Boyer, Martin (HEC Montreal)
- De Donder, Philippe (Toulouse School of Economics)
- Fluet, Claude Denys (Université Laval)
- Leroux, Marie-Louise (UQAM)
- Michaud, Pierre-Carl (HEC Montreal)
- Award Number: 435- 2016-1109
- Award Number: ANR-17-EURE-0010
AbstractThis paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
Is version of
Boyer, Martin, Philippe De Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise Leroux, and Pierre-Carl Michaud. “Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, n.d.
Update Metadata: 2020-07-23 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-07-23