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Data and Code for: Criminal Deterrence when there are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Gallagher, Justin (Montana State University)
  • Fisher, Paul (University of Arizona)
Publication Date
2020-07-23
Free Keywords
Traffic accidents; red light cameras
Description
  • Abstract

    Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents, but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries.
Temporal Coverage
  • 2003-01-01 / 2014-12-31
    Time Period: Wed Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2003--Wed Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 2014
Geographic Coverage
  • Texas, USA
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Has version
    DOI: 10.3886/E115107V1
Publications
  • Gallagher, Justin, and Paul Fisher. “Texas Traffic Accidents 2003-9 (CRIS).” Harvard Dataverse, 2017. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GGLKEM.
    • ID: 10.7910/DVN/GGLKEM (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-07-23 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-07-23

Gallagher, Justin; Fisher, Paul (2020): Data and Code for: Criminal Deterrence when there are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E115107