Data and Code for: Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search
- Coey, Dominic (Facebook)
- Larsen, Bradley (Stanford University)
- Platt, Brennan (Brigham Young University)
AbstractWe present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex-ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory. We quantify dynamic search frictions arising from deadlines and show how, with deadline-constrained buyers, seemingly neutral platform fee increases can cause large market shifts.
Data and code are available on the authors' websites and the AER data repository. Some of the data is proprietary and can only be accessed through following the instructions provided in the included README file.
Is version of
Coey, Dominic, Bradley Larsen, and Brennan Platt. “Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 22038, September 1, 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w22038.
- ID: https://www.nber.org/papers/w22038 (URL)
Update Metadata: 2020-07-24 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-07-24