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Replication files for "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data"

Resource Type
  • Jones, Charles I. (Stanford University, Graduate School of Business)
  • Tonetti, Christopher (Stanford University, Graduate School of Business)
Publication Date
Free Keywords
nonrivalry; economics of data; property rights
  • Abstract

    This repository contains the code needed to replicate all the results (figures and tables) in the Jones and Tonetti paper "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data."

    Abstract: Data is nonrival: a person's location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optimal. Consumers balance their concerns for privacy against the economic gains that come from selling data broadly.
This study is freely available to the general public via web download.
  • Is version of
    DOI: 10.3886/E119163
  • Jones, Charles I., and Christopher Tonetti. “Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data.” American Economic Review, n.d.

Update Metadata: 2020-08-28 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2020-08-28

Jones, Charles I.; Tonetti, Christopher (2020): Replication files for "Nonrivalry and the Economics of Data". Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.