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Data and Code for: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset : administrative records data, experimental data, survey data
Creator
  • Armand, Alex (Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
  • Coutts, Alexander (Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
  • Vicente, Pedro C. (Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
  • Vilela, Inês (Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
Publication Date
2020-10-21
Funding Reference
  • 3ie International Initiative for Impact Evaluation
    • Award Number: TW8R2/1008
  • International Growth Centre
    • Award Number: 89330
Free Keywords
Natural resources; curse; natural gas; information; deliberation; rent-seeking; Mozambique
Description
  • Abstract

    This project provides data and code for the replication of the paper "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique". The paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse by focusing on a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. Outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders are measured through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. Information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.
  • Weighting

    N/A
  • Methods

    Response Rates: A total of 2,065 heads of household were interviewed at the baseline, targeting 10 per community. Post-treatment attrition was handled through substitutions in the same household, when possible. Endline attrition rate at household-level is equal to 8.3%.
  • Methods

    Presence of Common Scales: Different scales. See Section C of the Online Appendix of the paper for further details about the data collection and the inclusion of external data sources.
Temporal Coverage
  • 2016-08-01 / 2016-09-30
    Time Period: Mon Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016--Fri Sep 30 00:00:00 EDT 2016 (Variable year = 2016)
  • 2017-08-01 / 2017-11-30
    Time Period: Tue Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017--Thu Nov 30 00:00:00 EST 2017 (Variable year = 2017)
  • 2016-08-01 / 2017-04-30
    Time Period: Mon Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016--Sun Apr 30 00:00:00 EDT 2017 (Post-baseline period - violent events)
  • 2017-05-01 / 2018-04-30
    Time Period: Mon May 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017--Mon Apr 30 00:00:00 EDT 2018 (Post-intervention period - violent events)
  • 2016-08-01 / 2016-09-30
    Collection Date(s): Mon Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2016--Fri Sep 30 00:00:00 EDT 2016 (Baseline survey)
  • 2017-08-01 / 2017-11-30
    Collection Date(s): Tue Aug 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017--Thu Nov 30 00:00:00 EST 2017 (Endline survey)
  • 2017-03-01 / 2018-12-31
    Collection Date(s): Wed Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 2017--Mon Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 2018 (Behavioural measurements)
Geographic Coverage
  • Mozambique
Sampled Universe
Household heads, local leaders, and communities in the Cabo Delgado province (Mozambique). Smallest Geographic Unit: Community
Sampling
We selected a sample of 206 communities in the province of Cabo Delgado. These were randomly drawn from the list of all 454 polling locations in the sampling frame, stratified on urban, semi-urban, and rural areas. To obtain the sampling frame, 52 polling stations with inconsistent information in either the 2009 or the 2014 general elections were excluded. Moreover, the smallest 5th percentile by voter size (corresponding to a cutoff of 207 voters) was also excluded. The polling locations were located within the following 16 districts in the province of Cabo Delgado: Ancuabe, Balama, Chiure, Macomia, Mecufi, Meluco,Metuge, Mocimboa da Praia, Montepuez, Mueda, Muidumbe, Namuno, Nangade,Palma, Pemba, and Quissanga. The Ibo district was excluded since it is an island, together with two other polling stations in another island. Eleven polling stations in Palma's posto administrativo were also excluded to avoid areas that had already experienced some violence related to relocation of communities.

To randomly allocate polling stations to different interventions, blocks of four communities were built using Mahalanobis-distance while exploiting the richness of baseline information. Within each block communities were randomly allocated with equal probability to either treatment 1, treatment 2 without the deliberation module, treatment 2 with the deliberation module, or a control group. This procedure resulted in 50, 51, 50, and 55 communities in each group, respectively. Sampling of citizens was the product of physical random walks during the baseline survey. In each house, heads of households were sampled for survey interviews and behavioral activities. 
Collection Mode
  • coded on-site observation; cognitive assessment test; face-to-face interview;

    The readme file attached to this project details the data that have been anonymized following the ethics approval of the project.

Availability
Download
This study is freely available to the general public via web download.
Relations
  • Is version of
    DOI: 10.3886/E119785
Publications
  • Armand, Alex, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, and Inês Vilela. “Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique.” American Economic Review, n.d.

Update Metadata: 2020-10-21 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-10-21

Armand, Alex; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro C.; Vilela, Inês (2020): Data and Code for: Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E119785V1