Data and Code for: How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset : administrative records data, aggregate data
Creator
  • Watzinger, Martin (LMU Munich)
  • Fackler, Thomas (Ifo Institute)
  • Nagler, Markus (FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg)
  • Schnitzer, Monika (LMU Munich)
Publication Date
2020-10-26
Funding Reference
  • DFG German Science Foundation
    • Award Number: CRC190
  • Elite Network of Bavaria
    • Award Number: Evidence-Based Economics
  • German Academic Exchange Service
Free Keywords
Innovation; Antitrust; intellectual property; Compulsory licensing
Description
  • Abstract

    This is the data used for our article "How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree".

    Abstract: Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree which settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We identify the effect of the consent decree on follow-on innovations building on Bell patents by using exactly matched non-Bell patents as control group. We show that the consent decree led to a lasting increase in innovation, but only in markets outside the telecommunications sector.
Geographic Coverage
  • United States
Sampled Universe
Registered Patents at the USPTO.
Availability
Download
This study is freely available to the general public via web download.
Relations
  • Is version of
    DOI: 10.3886/E115806
Publications
  • Watzinger, Martin, Thomas Fackler, Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer. “How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, n.d.

Update Metadata: 2020-10-26 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-10-26