Data and Code for: How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree
- Watzinger, Martin (LMU Munich)
- Fackler, Thomas (Ifo Institute)
- Nagler, Markus (FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg)
- Schnitzer, Monika (LMU Munich)
DFG German Science Foundation
- Award Number: CRC190
Elite Network of Bavaria
- Award Number: Evidence-Based Economics
- German Academic Exchange Service
AbstractThis is the data used for our article "How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree".
Abstract: Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree which settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We identify the effect of the consent decree on follow-on innovations building on Bell patents by using exactly matched non-Bell patents as control group. We show that the consent decree led to a lasting increase in innovation, but only in markets outside the telecommunications sector.
Is version of
Watzinger, Martin, Thomas Fackler, Markus Nagler, and Monika Schnitzer. “How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, n.d.
Update Metadata: 2020-10-26 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-10-26