Data and Code for: Competition and Entry in Agricultural Markets: Experimental Evidence from Kenya
- Bergquist, Lauren (University of Michigan)
- Dinerstein, Michael (University of Chicago)
AbstractAfrican agricultural markets are characterized by low farmer revenues and high consumer food prices. Many have worried that this wedge is partially driven by imperfect competition among intermediaries. This paper provides experimental evidence from Kenya on intermediary market structure. Randomized cost shocks and demand subsidies are used to identify a structural model of market competition. Estimates reveal that traders act consistently with joint profit maximization and earn median markups of 39%. Exogenously-induced firm entry has negligible effects on prices, and low take- up of subsidized entry offers implies large fixed costs. We estimate that traders capture 82% of total surplus.
2016-01-01 / 2016-12-31Time Period: Fri Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2016--Sat Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 2016
2016-01-01 / 2016-12-31Collection Date(s): Fri Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 2016--Sat Dec 31 00:00:00 EST 2016
Is version of
Bergquist, Lauren, and Michael Dinerstein. “Competition and Entry in Agricultural Markets: Experimental Evidence from Kenya.” American Economic Review, n.d.
Update Metadata: 2020-11-23 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-11-23