Replication Data for: The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Bazzi, Samuel (Boston University)
  • Gudgeon, Matthew (U.S. Military Academy)
Publication Date
2020-12-17
Description
  • Abstract

    We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit.
Geographic Coverage
  • Indonesia
Availability
Download
This study is freely available to the general public via web download.
Relations
  • Has version
    DOI: 10.3886/E116802V1
Publications
  • “The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, n.d.

Update Metadata: 2020-12-17 | Issue Number: 1 | Registration Date: 2020-12-17